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Abstract 
Despite California’s reputation as a solidly liberal state, there exist deep 
regional and neighborhood-level divisions in political ideology among voters. 
Factor analysis has been used in previous research to formulate an index of 
precinct-level ideology scores in California, based on the results of multiple 
ballot initiatives. However, the previous research (a) was conducted five years 
ago and measured a political landscape that has since changed considerably, and 
(b) used just two factors to form the precinct scores. The research here uses three 
factors to develop an improved index based on 2016 ballot initiative results. We 
find that California has grown more liberal overall and more polarized 
regionally. We also find that the new ideology index is highly predictive of 2016 
presidential vote, and that Hillary Clinton’s support relative to Donald Trump’s 
slightly exceeded the expectations set forth by corresponding precinct ideology 
scores, meaning Clinton was more popular relative to Trump than the voters’ 
ideology would otherwise indicate. The new ideology index illuminates the 
underlying beliefs and values of the California electorate at a granular level, 
helps us understand how those beliefs relate to presidential preferences, and has 
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1. Introduction 
The 2016 United States presidential election revealed shifts in party 
preference across the country. The most well-known and consequential shifts 
occurred in Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania – states that broke for the 
Republican candidate for the first time in over 25 years. Other states voted as 
expected but still experienced substantial shifts in party preference – Democratic-
leaning states such as Rhode Island and Maine shifted toward the Republican 
candidate from 2012 to 2016, while Republican-leaning states like Texas and 
Arizona saw swings toward the Democratic candidate. These in-state shifts did 
not result in changes to the outcome, but they still underscore important party 
preference changes and serve as prominent examples of how state electorates are 
ideologically varied. 
The simplest and most accessible indicator of perceived political ideology 
of a geographical area is electoral support of a presidential candidate from the 
most recent presidential election. In the U.S., we often label states (or other 
political subdivisions such as congressional districts or counties) as “Democratic” 
or “Republican” (or usually, more simply, “blue” or “red”) depending on if that 
area voted for the latest Democratic or Republican presidential or congressional 
candidate. 
However, there are two issues with this approach. First, labeling political 
subdivisions “blue” or “red” oversimplifies the ideological nuance of the 
electorate in these areas. For example, Arizona is known as a conservative red 
state – every major state elected official and both U.S. senators are Republican, 
the state legislature is controlled by Republicans, and Republican presidential 
candidates have won the state in every election but one since 1952. However, 
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Hillary Clinton only lost Arizona by 3.5 percentage points, gaining 45 percent of 
the vote and showing that there is a substantial amount of liberal residents in 
what is known as a conservative state. Most states are not monoliths. Where do 
these differing voters live and what characteristics do they have? A more 
detailed measurement of ideology can provide a nuanced understanding of the 
ideological variations within a geographical subdivision. 
Second, it can be a misrepresentation to assume voters’ political ideology 
based on presidential election results. There are three concepts at play: (1) 
political ideology (simplified as a scale from liberal to conservative, with 
moderate in between), (2) political party alignment, and (3) candidate voting 
preference. Of course, there is usually a very strong correlation between all three 
of these concepts – an individual who supports liberal policies will often self-
identify as a Democrat and vote for Democratic candidates, just as an individual 
who supports conservative policies will often identify as a Republican and vote 
for Republican candidates. This is not true in all cases however, as voters will not 
always vote strictly according to their ideology or party. Decisions to vote for a 
particular candidate can be influenced by the candidate’s personality and 
appearance,1 or the efficacy or messaging of their campaign,2 resulting in a vote 
that does not necessarily reflect the voter’s ideology. 
Ballot measure election results have the potential to reveal more 
established ideological beliefs, since voter opinions on the issues addressed by 
ballot measures are not subject to candidate characteristics or qualities. However, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Thomas Lee Budesheim and Stephen J. DePaola, “Beauty or the Beast? The Effects of 
2	  Henry E. Brady, Richard Johnston, and John Sides, “The Study of Political Campaigns,” 
in Capturing Campaign Effects, ed. Henry E. Brady and Richard Johnston (Ann Arbor: University 
of Michigan Press, 2006), 18. 
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the U.S. does not hold nationwide ballot measure elections – states are the largest 
political subdivisions where ballot measure elections are conducted. Since ballot 
measures results are used in this research to measure ideology, this precludes the 
ability to develop an ideology index for the whole country using this approach. 
However, it allows for an index in any state that puts ballot measures before its 
electorate. California is an ideal state to study, since their statewide elections 
frequently ask voters to vote on multiple ballot measures. 
In this research, results are used from seven statewide propositions to 
develop a granular political ideology index for the whole state of California, 
culminating in ideology scores for over 20,000 precincts. The methodology is 
based on a previous index developed by David Latterman of the University of 
San Francisco,3 but uses more recent election results and makes small but 
consequential alterations to the factor analysis conducted to form the ideology 
scores. 
Through this new California political ideology index, we find California 
has grown more liberal overall and more polarized geographically. Ideology is 
highly predictive of 2016 presidential vote, though support for Hillary Clinton 
(or opposition to Donald Trump) was slightly stronger among liberals than their 
ideology would otherwise indicate. As expected, ideology is also closely 
associated with the political parties of Congressional representatives. Ideological 
beliefs correlate particularly strongly with opinions on gun control and crime 
and punishment issues, such as the death penalty, but are less correlated with 
opinions on marijuana legalization. Many liberals are also found to be less 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  David Latterman, “The California Political Precinct Index: A detailed tool to help understand 
California politics,” Fall Line Analytics, 2012, http://www.flanalytics.com/research/	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supportive of income tax increases on the wealthy and death penalty repeal than 
expected according to their ideology scores. 
Measuring political ideology and its geographical variations at the 
precinct-level can be of use to groups or individuals that wish to identify 
geographical nuances and variations in ideology with precision. Election or 
signature-gathering campaigns can utilize the ideology index to pinpoint 
precincts that would be either receptive or persuadable to their message. These 
precincts can serve as areas of focus for canvassing, mail, GOTV, or other 
targeting efforts. If made accessible and user-friendly, citizens can use the 
ideological measurement to assess the values and beliefs of a particular 
neighborhood when deciding where to live or spend time. Additionally, the 
ideology index can be of scholarly interest in providing a measurement with 
which to study geographical political trends and phenomena, in order to gain an 
updated understanding of the political landscape in California. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
2.1. Political Ideology, Party Identification, and Candidate Voting Preferences  
In order to measure political ideology, it is useful to understand its 
definition and how it relates to party identification and candidate preferences. 
Political ideology has been defined in previous literature as a “set of beliefs about 
the proper order of society and how it can be achieved.”4 Ideologies are 
frameworks of shared beliefs, opinions, and values among social groups or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Robert S. Erikson and Kent L. Tedin, American Public Opinion (New York: Longman, 2003), 64. 
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constituencies,5 6 dictating how individuals or groups perceive society and how 
political ideals should be attained.7 One concept closely related to political 
ideology is party identification, which is commonly known as “an effective 
attachment to an important group object in the environment,”8 and further 
defined as a long-term attachment to a preferred political party.9 That emotional 
attachment to a political party is based on the party’s public image,	  10	  11 and can 
be a facet of one’s identity just as ethnic or religious identity.12 
The relationship between ideology and party identification is contested 
among scholars. Some argue that party identification is reliant on existing 
ideological beliefs,13 while others assert that ideology is dependent on party 
identification, especially as elite-level Democrats and Republicans have become 
more polarized, causing individuals to tailor their policy preferences to their 
partisan leanings.14 
Regardless of whether ideology drives party identification or vice versa, it 
is clear that the two concepts are closely tied. If so, why not base an ideology 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Michael Freeden, "Political Ideologies in Substance and Method," Reassessing Political Ideologies–
The Durability of Dissent (2001): 1. 
6	  Kathleen Knight, “Transformations of the Concept of Ideology in the Twentieth Century,” 
American Political Science Review 100, no. 4 (2006): 622-23. 
7	  John T. Jost, Christopher M. Federico, and Jamie L. Napier, “Political Ideology: Its Structure, 
Functions, and Elective Affinities,” Annual Review of Psychology 60, (2009): 309. 
8	  Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter (New York: Wiley, 1960). 
9	  Russell J. Dalton, “Party Identification and Its Implications,” Oxford Research Encyclopedias 
(2016), doi: 10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.72. 
10	  Paul Goren, “Party Identification and Core Political Values,” American Journal of Political Science 
49, no. 4 (2005): 882.	  
11	  Campbell et al., The American Voter. 
12	  Ibid.	  
13	  Alan I. Abramowitz and Kyle L. Saunders, "Ideological Realignment in the US Electorate," The 
Journal of Politics 60, no. 3 (1998): 634.	  
14	  Thomas M. Carsey and Geoffrey C. Layman, "Party Polarization and ‘Conflict Extension’ in the 
American Electorate," American Journal of Political Science 46, no. 4 (2006): 786.	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index on vote percentages in candidate elections where the candidates’ political 
parties are specified, such as presidential, gubernatorial, congressional, or state 
legislative races? Party identification is a distinct concept from voting 
preferences,15 especially when those voting preferences are also influenced by 
candidate qualities and characteristics. 
Voters in the U.S. rely on their own party identification or political 
ideology as a cue for selecting political candidates for whom to vote, but 
candidate qualities can also have an impact. Research differs on the overall 
importance of presidential candidate qualities in voter decisions – some have 
found that presidential candidates’ personal traits play a significant role in voter 
decisions,16 17 while others find that candidate personalities and images have 
only a minor impact on election outcomes.18 Some traits certainly matter more 
than others – for example, a candidate’s sex and race play a significant role in 
voting preferences.19 20 The effect of candidate traits can also be dependent on 
whether the candidate is an incumbent or challenger.21 
Candidates make appeals to voters through campaigns, which can also 
impact voting preferences. Facets of the campaign, such as the candidate’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  Dalton, “Party Identification.”	  
16	  Gregory B. Markus, "Political Attitudes During an Election Year: A Report on the 1980 NES 
Panel Study," American Political Science Review 76, no. 3 (1982): 538. 
17	  Carolyn L. Funk, "The Impact of Scandal on Candidate Evaluations: An Experimental Test of 
the Role of Candidate Traits," Political Behavior 18, no. 1 (1996): 1. 
18	  Larry M. Bartels, “The Impact of Candidate Traits in American Presidential Elections,” in 
Leaders’ Personalities and the Outcomes of Democratic Elections, ed. Anthony King (Oxford 
University Press, 2002). 
19	  Kira Sanbonmatsu, "Gender Stereotypes and Vote Choice," American Journal of 
Political Science (2002): 20. 
20	  Josh Pasek et al., "Determinants of Turnout and Candidate Choice in the 2008 US Presidential 
Election: Illuminating the Impact of Racial Prejudice and other Considerations," Public Opinion 
Quarterly 73, no. 5 (2009): 943.	  
21	  Kim L. Fridkin and Patrick J. Kenney, "The Role of Candidate Traits in Campaigns," The Journal 
of Politics 73, no. 1 (2011): 72. 
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presented image or the issues they choose to prioritize in their appeals, have 
been found to affect vote choice.22 These campaign effects often manifest 
themselves through the process of priming, framing, and agenda setting,23 
through advertising and media coverage.24 However, though campaigns can 
influence voter decisions, the majority of political research over the last 50 years 
has found the effects to be minimal.25 26 
Although the exact nature of the effect of candidate qualities and 
campaigns on voting outcomes is debated, it is clear that an effect does exist. 
Using candidate election results to develop the ideology index would have led to 
trouble, due to the difficulty of isolating ideology’s influence on voting 
preferences compared to the influence of candidate and campaign effects. This is 
especially true for the 2016 presidential election, where both Hillary Clinton and 
Donald Trump were the most unpopular major party candidates in recent 
history.27 Though candidate preferences are closely associated with party 
preferences and political ideology, the concepts do not always align.28 It would 
have been ill advised to base our understanding of the ideological variations of 
the electorate on the presidential election, where many factors play a role in vote 
decisions. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Dalton, “Party Identification.”	  
23	  Diana Carole Mutz, Paul M. Sniderman, and Richard A. Brody, eds, Political Persuasion and 
Attitude Change (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996). 
24	  Stephen Ansolobehere and Shanto Iyengar, Going Negative: How Political Adveritsement Shrink 
and Polarize the Electorate (New York: Free Press, 1995).	  
25	  Campbell et al., The American Voter.	  
26	  Larry M. Bartels, "Messages Received: The Political Impact of Media Exposure," American 
Political Science Review 87, no. 2 (1993): 267. 
27	  Gary C. Jacobson, "The Triumph of Polarized Partisanship in 2016: Donald Trump's 
Improbable Victory," Political Science Quarterly 132, no. 1 (2017): 16. 
28	  Dalton, “Party Identification.” 
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Ballot measure election results, rather than candidate results, are more 
reliable indicators of voters’ ideological beliefs. Ballot measure votes reflect 
preferences for single issues, which are steady and well-structured,29 as opposed 
to candidate voting preferences that can be influenced by other factors. When a 
wide array of ballot measures is used to make the index, the measurement can 
take into account opinions on a diverse set of clearly defined issues. Using ballot 
measure results for the California-wide index also presents methodological 
advantages to candidate results. First, there are not enough highly publicized 
candidate races that are voted on by the whole state upon which to base an 
index, as opposed to ballot measures which are both abundant and consistently 
presented to the whole state. Second, California employs a top-two primary 
system, where the top-two vote-getters in candidate primary elections proceed to 
the general election ballot, regardless of the candidates’ party affiliations. In a 
heavily Democratic state like California, this results in many general election 
races between two Democrats. It would be impossible to assess political ideology 
based on a race between two members of the same party. Such a pitfall can be 
avoided with the use of ballot measures. It should be noted however that even 
though ballot measure preferences are not subject to candidate effects, campaign 
effects still exist, especially when a large amount of money is spent to advocate 
for or against a certain ballot measure.30 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  Stephen Ansolabehere, Jonathan Rodden, and James M. Snyder, "The Strength of Issues: Using 
Multiple Measures to Gauge Preference Stability, Ideological Constraint, and Issue 
Voting," American Political Science Review 102, no. 2 (2008): 215. 
30	  Thomas Stratmann, "The Effectiveness of Money in Ballot Measure Campaigns," Southern 
California Law Review 78 (2004): 123. 
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2.2. Historical Granular Measurements of Political Ideology 
Surveys have been used to measure ideology at a congressional district 
level,31 but survey sample sizes are usually too small to have enough 
respondents to make district-level conclusions without large measurement 
error.32 Multi-level regression and post-stratification models have been used as 
well to create ideal point estimates for congressional districts.33 Researchers have 
used vote share and election result data to measure political ideology,34 35 but 
most of it has, again, been done at the district level rather than the more detailed 
precinct level, with the exception of Nahm et al.36 
The analysis contained here is specifically based on David Latterman’s 
California Political Precinct Index,37 which was extrapolated from Latterman and 
Rich DeLeon’s update to their original “progressive voter index” of San 
Francisco precincts.38 Latterman’s index is a conservative-to-liberal scale from 0 
to 100, with each precinct in California scoring somewhere on the scale. Precinct 
scores are formulated from an aggregation of election results for nine statewide 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  Wakken E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," American 
Political Science Review 57, no. 1 (1963): 45-56. 
32	  Robert S. Erikson, "Constituency Opinion and Congressional Behavior: A Reexamination of the 
Miller-Stokes Representation Data," American Journal of Political Science (1978): 511-535. 
33	  Chris Tausanovitch and Christopher Warshaw, "Measuring Constituent Policy Preferences in 
Congress, State Legislatures, and Cities," The Journal of Politics 75, no. 2 (2013): 330. 
34	  Matthew S. Levendusky, Jeremy C. Pope, and Simon D. Jackman, "Measuring District-Level 
Partisanship with Implications for the Analysis of US Elections," The Journal of Politics 70, no. 3 
(2008): 736. 
35	  Jonathan N. Katz and Gary King, "A Statistical Model for Multiparty Electoral Data," American 
Political Science Review 93, no. 1 (1999): 15-32. 
36	  Alison Nahm, Alex Pentland, and Peter Krafft, "Inferring Population Preferences via Mixtures 
of Spatial Voting Models," in International Conference on Social Informatics, 290-311, Springer 
International Publishing, 2016. 
37	  David Latterman, “The California Political Precinct Index.” 
38	  Richard DeLeon and David Latterman, “Updating the New Progressive Voting Index (PVI), 
with Tables, Map, and Precinct Scores,”Fall Line Analytics, 2004, 
http://www.flanalytics.com/research/ 
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ballot measures from 2008 to 2010. The particular ballot measures were selected 
primarily because of their clear, defensible, liberal and conservative sides. 
Latterman compiled the results from the nine ballot measures and used 
factor analysis with varimax rotation to obtain two independent factors that were 
then summed and standardized on a 0-100 scale, with 0 as the most conservative 
value and 100 as the most liberal. The aim of this analysis is to update the 
findings for improved accuracy in 2017. The analysis presented here will employ 
most of the same methodology as Latterman’s, but using more current statewide 
ballot measure results to gauge precinct scores, as well as changing the method 
of factor analysis. 
 
3. Data and Methods 
 The methodology used to develop the new ideology index largely mirrors 
David Latterman’s methodology for constructing his 2012 California precinct 
index.39 There are two primary differences in the development of this new index: 
(1) it is based on election results from 2016, which provides a more current 
assessment of ideology in California, and (2) it is built using three latent factors 
rather than two. An explanation for why three factors were used will be 
addressed in Section 3.2. 
 
3.1. Ballot Proposition Selection 
 First came the selection of ballot propositions to use for the index. 
Propositions with clear, defendable liberal and conservative sides were selected. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  David Latterman, “The California Political Precinct Index.	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The seven propositions selected for the index are depicted in Table 3.1. For each 
of them, the conventional liberal side is “yes” and conservative side is “no.” 
Table 3.1 – 2016 California Ballot Propositions Used for Ideology Index 
Proposition Description Yes Vote 
No 
Vote 
51 Education bond 55.2% 44.8% 
55 Income tax to support education 63.3% 36.7% 
57 Relaxed sentencing for non-violent felons 64.5% 35.5% 
58 Bilingual education in public schools 73.5% 26.5% 
62 Death penalty repeal 46.9% 53.1% 
63 Gun control/improved background checks 63.1% 36.9% 
64 Legalization of recreational marijuana 57.1% 42.9% 
 Source: California Secretary of State 
 The index would have benefitted from utilizing results from multiple state 
elections, e.g. using ballot measure results from 2014 as well as 2016. But since 
precinct designations and boundaries often change, and do so at the direction of 
individual counties, it was not within the scope of this research to consolidate 
precinct results from two different elections within the time constraints given, a 
process that would have involved breaking the results down into census blocks 
and then aggregating those blocks into 2014 and 2016 precincts. 
 
3.2. Factor Analysis and Using Three Factors 
 After collecting election result data from the Statewide Database from 
University of California, Berkeley,40 I performed a factor analysis with three 
factors and varimax rotation using the “yes” vote percentages of the seven 
propositions in each precinct to generate precinct-level ideology scores, which 
produced eigenvalues explaining the variance accounted for by the three factors. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  “2016 General Election Precinct Data,” Statewide Database, University of California, Berkeley, 
accessed December 5, 2017. http://statewidedatabase.org/d10/g16.html.	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Based on the Kaiser rule, which dictates that factors with eigenvalues of at least 
one are important enough to retain, all three factors were used to determine the 
precinct scores.41 Table 3.2 presents the eigenvalues and variance for each factor. 
Table 3.2 – Eigenvalues and Variance of the Three Factors 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Eigenvalue 2.513 2.512 1.150 
Proportional Variance 0.359 0.359 0.164 
Cumulative Variance 0.359 0.718 0.882 
 
 A factor in this context is an underlying construct that causes the 
variations in proposition results from precinct to precinct. Factors 1 and 2 are 
equally important and both explain a greater part of the variation in the results 
than Factor 3 does, according to their eigenvalues. Factor loadings for each 
variable indicate the degree to which the results of each proposition are driven 
by the three underlying factors. Table 3.3 contains the factor loadings for the 
seven propositions. 
Table 3.3 – Factor Loadings for Each Proposition 
Proposition Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
51 0.87 0.24 0.29 
55 0.83 0.39 0.20 
57 0.48 0.75 0.36 
58 0.68 0.56 0.34 
62 0.36 0.75 0.44 
63 0.44 0.50 0.75 
64 0.25 0.79 0.18 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41	  Henry F. Kaiser, "The application of electronic computers to factor analysis," Educational and 
Psychological Measurement 20, no. 1 (1960): 141-151. 
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How do we interpret the factors? Factors 1 and 2 have a fairly linear 
relationship. The loadings for both factors are tightly correlated (with a 
correlation coefficient of -0.88), meaning that the two factors explain similar 
phenomena. Propositions 51 and 55 are on one end, loading highly on Factor 1 
but lowly on Factor 2, while Propositions 57, 62, and 64 have somewhat similar 
high loadings on Factor 2 and relatively low loadings on Factor 1. This 
divergence makes logical sense – Propositions 51 (bond measure) and 55 (income 
tax measure on those making over $250,000) are the two financial propositions in 
the dataset, while Propositions 57 (reforming sentencing for non-violent felons), 
62 (death penalty repeal), and 64 (marijuana legalization) are more related to 
crime and punishment. Though liberals are generally expected to vote “yes” on 
all of the propositions, and conservatives expected to vote “no,” some voters may 
be more liberal on financial issues but conservative on cultural issues, and vice 
versa. Variations and nuance in policy preferences result in the different loadings 
for each proposition. 
Factor 3 is more difficult to interpret. It has a very low correlation with 
either of the other two factors. Proposition 63 (gun control) has an extremely 
high loading on Factor 3 compared to the other ballot measures, especially 
Proposition 64 (marijuana) and the two financial measures. It is possible that 
Factor 3 reflects the fact that some voters’ opinions on such diverse concerns as 
gun control versus marijuana legalization or progressive taxes may not conform 
to traditional liberal/conservative expectations. For example, voters in certain 
precincts may have more libertarian values of less government control over both 
firearms and drugs, which would cause them to support the “conservative” side 
of gun control but the “liberal” side of marijuana legalization. Or there may be 
	   14	  
poorer rural voters who favor Proposition 55’s income tax on wealthy 
individuals but oppose gun control. These potential deviations from traditional 
ideological norms could explain the variance described by Factor 3. 
Each proposition also has a communality and uniqueness value. The 
communality value is determined by summing the eigenvalues of all three 
factors, and uniqueness = 1 – communality. The uniqueness value for a 
proposition reflects the degree to which that proposition uniquely causes 
variance not shared with other propositions in the voting results. Most of the 
uniqueness values for the propositions are fairly low, between 0.005 and 0.117, 
with the exception of Proposition 64, the marijuana legalization measure, which 
has a uniqueness value of 0.279. Proposition 64 adds a more unique element to 
the variance in the results than the other propositions.  
The factor analysis process provides each precinct in the dataset with 
values for each of the three factors based on that precinct’s proposition vote 
percentages. These scores were then summed and scaled to a range of 0 to 100, 
with 0 being conservative and 100 being liberal. Only precincts with at least 20 
registered voters were considered in the analysis, resulting in 20,778 precincts in 
total with composite political ideology scores. 
 
4. Results 
4.1. California: More Liberal Overall and More Polarized Regionally 
Figure 4.1 depicts the overall distribution of precinct ideology scores. The 
mean precinct score is 61.2 and median precinct score is 63.1.  
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Figure 4.1 
 
 As expected, there is considerable geographical variation in ideology. 
Figure 4.2 is a boxplot displaying the distributions of precinct scores in every 
county in California. Bay Area counties such as San Francisco, Marin, and 
Alameda are very liberal, as well as Los Angeles County, while less populated 
counties in the northern and Central Valley regions, such as Tehama, Lassen, and 
Modoc, are more conservative. A consolidated look at the distribution of scores 
by region is depicted in Figure 4.3. 
 Compared to Latterman’s previous index, the mean and median precinct 
ideology scores have increased. The mean has increased from 56.3 to 61.2, while 
the median has increased from 56.4 to 63.1. This could be attributed to two 
elements, acting in confluence with each other – (1) the state has grown more  
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Figure 4.3 
 
liberal as a whole, and (2) this new and altered way of measuring ideology, 
which includes (a) conducting three-factor analysis rather than two and (b) using 
data from different propositions addressing different policy issues, has had an 
effect on the outcome. The degree to which each of these two elements accounts 
for the higher mean and median precinct scores is uncertain. 
 Political ideology also appears to have become more regionally polarized. 
The standard deviation of precinct scores has increased from 11.7 to 16.7, 
meaning that the distribution of precinct scores throughout the whole state is 
wider and thus more polarized. This polarization is concentrated regionally – 
liberal counties have become more liberal and conservative counties have 
become more conservative. This phenomenon is depicted in Figure 4.4, where 
most counties with conservative scores (scores under 50) experienced a decrease  
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Figure 4.4 
 
In Figure 4.3, the thin black line represents “y=x” – if county mean scores remained consistent 
from 2012 to 2017, the counties would lie on this line. The thicker blue line is the regression line. 
 
in their mean score, while liberal counties (with scores over 50) largely saw an 
increase in their mean score in 2017. The noticeably smaller slope of the 
regression line compared to the y=x line highlights this change. 
 
4.2. Congressional District Scores Line Up With Congressional Party 
 Figure 4.7 is a boxplot much like the one for counties in Figure 4.5, but it 
shows the distribution of precinct scores in each U.S. congressional district,  
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arranged from most liberal to most conservative. It is clear that the ideology 
index has a close association with congressmember parties in congressional 
districts – more liberal districts have Democratic representatives and more 
conservative districts have Republican representatives. Districts with a median 
ideology score between 47 and 57 have both Democratic and Republican 
districts. Districts 49, 48, and 39 – all located in Orange County – are the most 
liberal districts to be represented by Republicans, with mean scores well over 50. 
District 3, northwest of Sacramento in the northern inland part of the state, is the 
only conservative district held by a Democrat, with a mean score of 48. The most 
ideologically diverse district, based on its wide distribution of ideology scores 
and substantial amounts of both liberal and conservative precincts, is District 21, 
held by a Republican and located in the Central Valley. 
 
4.3. Examining the Relationships Between Ideology and the Proposition Results 
Figure 4.6 allows us to see the nuance in the relationships between 
ideology and each proposition result. It is clear that Proposition 63, with its 
correlation coefficient of 0.97, is the greatest predictor of ideology score, implying 
that opinions on gun control are highly predictive of overall ideological belief. 
Propositions 57 and 58 also correlate strongly with ideology, though both 
measures seemed to be more popular with voters across the spectrum than their 
precinct’s ideology score would seem to indicate. For example, even the average 
precinct with a conservative score of 20 still supported bilingual education (Prop 
58) at a rate just above 50%. 
Proposition 62, which would have repealed the death penalty, was the 
only measure in our study that did not pass. Though opinions on the death 
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penalty are still very highly correlated with ideology, the plot shows that many 
typically liberal precincts voted more conservatively on the issue than their 
ideology score would indicate. For example, according to the LOESS curve, the 
average 70-score precinct was split 50-50 on the death penalty repeal. 
Table 4.1 – Correlation Between Ideology Score and Proposition Results 
 
Proposition Description Correlation Coefficient 
51 Education bond 0.80 
55 Income tax to support education 0.82 
57 Relaxed sentencing for non-violent felons 0.92 
58 Bilingual education in public schools 0.91 
62 Death penalty repeal 0.90 
63 Gun control/improved background checks 0.97 
64 Legalization of recreational marijuana 0.71 
 
Proposition 64, which legalized recreational marijuana use, has the 
weakest correlation of the group, with a correlation coefficient of 0.71. A weaker 
correlation implies that there are other factors besides conventional political 
ideology that play into voters’ positions on marijuana legalization. Though those 
in favor of Proposition 64 were generally more liberal, both the “yes” and “no” 
campaigns received bi-partisan endorsements and, according to polling, support 
was highly dependent on age, regardless of political persuasion.42 Similarly to 
Proposition 62, the plot for Proposition 64 shows that many liberal precincts did 
not support the measure to the degree expected by their ideology scores. 
The financial measures, Propositions 51 and 55, were strongly correlated 
with ideology (correlation coefficients of 0.80 and 0.82, respectively), especially 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  “USC Dornsife/Los Angeles Times Frequency Questionnaire, October 22-30, 2016,” Greenberg 
Quinlan Rosner Research,	  accessed December 5, 2017. 
https://gqrr.app.box.com/s/67rosf94ccth3qmpedalm1wxv0uim9p7	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compared to Proposition 64, but their correlations were weaker than the rest of 
the measures. Support for Proposition 51 (the education bond) tailed off in the 
strongly liberal precincts. For Proposition 55, which extended the tax increase on 
incomes over $250,000 to primarily fund education, the LOESS curve indicates a 
fairly linear relationship between ideology and support for the measure. But the 
bulge in the fourth quadrant of the plot suggests that, again, there were many 
otherwise liberal precincts that did not vote for Proposition 55 as expected, 
especially in San Francisco, Los Angeles, and San Diego Counties. 
 
4.4. The Predictive Relationship Between Ideology and 2016 Presidential Vote 
The new ideology scores are extraordinarily predictive of the 2016 
presidential vote – the correlation between the two variables is 0.96, which is 
greater than the correlation between the scores and every proposition that went 
into formulating the score, except for Proposition 63. The relationship between 
precinct ideology scores and presidential vote is displayed in Figure 4.7. 
The relationship between ideology score and 2016 presidential vote gives 
us both a good measure for assessing the performance of the ideology scores, as 
well as a sense for how the presidential election tracked with ideology. Besides 
the strong correlation, we see that as ideology score increases above 55, Clinton 
vote percentage tends to slightly outpace ideology score. If we follow the LOESS 
curve, we see that a precinct with a score of 70 is expected to have given Clinton 
75% of the vote, or a precinct with a score of 80 is expected to have voted for 
Clinton at a rate of about 87%, etc. This finding implies that in liberal precincts, 
Clinton was more popular (or Trump less popular) than the voters’ overall 
ideology would seem to indicate. 
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Figure 4.7 
 
It should be noted that the measure of 2016 presidential vote here is strictly the major political 
party vote, i.e. Figure 4.6 shows the relationship between ideology score and the percent of 
Clinton and Trump voters that voted for Clinton, rather than Clinton’s overall vote percentage. 
Since the ideology index is a two-way liberal/conservative measurement of ideology, it is more 
useful to measure the relative performances of Democrats (representing liberals) and Republicans 
(representing conservatives), especially considering that the two major parties received over 93% 
of the total presidential vote in 2016. 
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5. Conclusion 
 The improved political ideology index suggests that California has 
become more liberal overall. It is likely that the simple nature of using differing 
propositions from the 2012 index to construct the new index contributed to the 
more liberal statewide mean ideology score. Forming more indexes in the future 
using forthcoming proposition election results will be crucial in determining 
whether an increased liberal mean score is indeed a function of ideological 
change among the California electorate, or a byproduct of the methodological 
choices in this research. The new index also suggests that California has become 
more ideologically polarized geographically. Counties that lean conservative, 
primarily in rural, inland areas of the state (especially in the Alpine, North, and 
Central Valley regions) have become more conservative, while counties that lean 
liberal, mostly in coastal, urban areas (such as the Bay Area, L.A. area, and 
Central Coast regions) have become more liberal since 2012.  
 The ideology index is especially predictive of 2016 presidential vote, as 
well as opinions on gun control. Ideology is also closely correlated with opinions 
on crime and punishment and bilingual education. Although ideology is still 
associated with opinions on bonds, income taxes for the wealthy, and marijuana 
legalization, the association is not as strong as with the other issues. Liberals in 
urban centers are less likely than other liberals to support an income tax increase, 
while other factors (such as age) are more associated with opinions on marijuana 
legalization. When precinct scores are aggregated by congressional district, as 
expected, liberal districts are generally represented by Democrats, while 
conservative districts are represented by Republicans.  
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 The new ideology index could have been strengthened if it were 
developed using results from multiple elections. If proposition results from the 
midterm election in 2014 were used in conjunction with 2016 results, the index 
results would have had greater certainty and been more representative of the 
ideology of the various precincts, since it would have captured a cross-section of 
voters from the two elections. This index only uses 2016 results because precinct 
boundaries in California often change at the discretion of individual counties, 
making it difficult to have a consistent set of precincts to form the scores. In order 
to use results from multiple years, David Latterman, in his California Political 
Precinct Index from 2012,43 broke precincts into U.S. Census blocks, assigned 
precinct election results to each block, and re-aggregated the block results into 
“base” precincts from one of the years used. This method was not possible under 
the constraints of this research project. 
Researchers in the future should also use the Census block data for 
another reason: to analyze the relationship between ideology scores and other 
demographic information. Voter precinct boundaries are not associated with 
Census subdivisions, such as tracts and blocks, which makes it difficult to obtain 
demographic information at a precinct level. As part of Latterman’s analysis, he 
examined the effect of concentrations of Latino voters on various proposition 
results from 2008-2010, finding that even though Latinos are solid Democratic 
voters, they had more conservative views on legalizing same-sex marriage and 
marijuana at the time.44 Further research should incorporate all sorts of 
demographic variables, such as ethnicity, age, education, and income, to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43	  David Latterman, “The California Political Precinct Index.”	  
44	  Ibid.	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precinct index to provide additional insight and deeper understanding of the 
ideological variations. 
This ideology index improves our understanding of the ideological 
nuance within California. Researchers can use it to assess the current political 
landscape and as a point of comparison for future indexes, in order to gauge 
ideological trends across the state. The index can be valuable to campaigns and 
individuals as well. Campaigns can use the precinct-level scores to inform 
communication and outreach strategies and focus on areas receptive to their 
message. Individuals, can utilize it, if made accessible and user-friendly, to make 
educated decisions as to where to live or spend time. The methodology 
contained here can also be adapted to develop ideology indexes in other areas of 
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Appendix A – Region Specifications 
In order to better understand the analysis of the ideology index, counties 
were divided into “regions.” To simplify comparison with David Latterman’s 
2012 index, the same regions he defined were used here. The counties in each 
region are listed below. 
 
Alpine	   Bay	  Area	   Central	  Coast	   Central	  
Valley	  
LA	  Area	   North	   South	  
Alpine	   Alameda	   Monterey	   Amador	   Los	  Angeles	   Del	  Norte	   Imperial	  
El	  Dorado	   Contra	  Costa	   San	  Benito	   Butte	   Orange	   Humboldt	   Riverside	  
Inyo	   Marin	   San	  Luis	  Obispo	   Calaveras	   Ventura	   Lassen	   S.Bernardino	  
Mono	   Napa	   Santa	  Barbara	   Colusa	   	   Mendocino	   San	  Diego	  
Nevada	   San	  Francisco	   Santa	  Cruz	   Fresno	   	   Modoc	   	  
Placer	   San	  Mateo	   	   Glenn	   	   Plumas	   	  
Sierra	   Santa	  Clara	   	   Kern	   	   Shasta	   	  
	   Solano	   	   Kings	   	   Siskiyou	   	  
	   Sonoma	   	   Lake	   	   Trinity	   	  
	   	   	   Madera	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   Mariposa	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   Merced	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   Sacramento	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   San	  Joaquin	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   Stanislaus	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   Sutter	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   Tehama	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   Tulare	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   Tuolumne	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   Yolo	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Appendix B – County Ideology Scores Summary Table 
 









Alameda 949 77.51 78.88 25.15 97.67 72.53 12.66 10.19 11.24 
Alpine 5 56.66 57.40 43.28 67.10 23.82 10.46 -­‐2.66 -­‐0.65 
Amador 30 35.34 34.51 17.68 54.77 37.09 7.68 -­‐6.44 -­‐7.16 
Butte 128 45.29 43.66 16.38 80.22 63.84 13.48 -­‐0.86 -­‐1.51 
Calaveras 29 37.92 35.50 25.16 51.36 26.20 7.31 -­‐6.66 -­‐9.79 
Colusa 18 38.33 36.64 17.10 69.02 51.92 13.69 2.29 0.80 
Contra	  Costa 612 67.28 67.22 24.70 93.06 68.37 10.84 7.26 7.61 
Del	  Norte 18 40.83 41.16 25.72 51.44 25.72 7.39 -­‐8.40 -­‐8.24 
El	  Dorado 148 40.55 38.22 20.04 71.82 51.78 11.89 -­‐2.69 -­‐2.84 
Fresno 521 49.42 50.19 5.89 94.20 88.31 16.41 0.71 2.18 
Glenn 34 31.68 29.77 10.08 63.19 53.11 13.26 -­‐2.45 -­‐4.81 
Humboldt 122 57.00 56.97 26.27 87.38 61.11 12.96 -­‐0.34 0.55 
Imperial 125 56.92 57.74 3.88 87.38 83.50 18.39 3.59 3.48 
Inyo 23 45.76 45.09 26.27 64.40 38.13 11.55 -­‐3.61 -­‐2.97 
Kern 514 43.92 40.44 0.00 94.64 94.64 17.26 1.25 -­‐0.99 
Kings 142 40.81 40.51 1.26 75.21 73.94 16.69 -­‐3.81 -­‐4.67 
Lake 65 47.88 48.34 27.77 63.85 36.08 7.20 -­‐7.60 -­‐6.75 
Lassen 49 25.46 24.98 6.79 61.14 54.35 9.95 -­‐14.71 -­‐15.31 
Los	  Angeles 4523 70.65 72.55 17.78 95.25 77.47 11.76 8.40 9.13 
Madera 91 39.97 37.16 19.75 72.06 52.31 14.24 -­‐5.68 -­‐7.50 
Marin 173 78.83 80.07 48.05 93.37 45.32 8.01 13.11 14.08 
Mariposa 25 36.98 31.91 7.54 83.18 75.64 14.93 -­‐10.41 -­‐12.28 
Mendocino 198 58.55 58.35 27.79 88.78 60.99 11.19 -­‐3.38 -­‐3.41 
Merced 224 51.09 53.18 4.33 89.16 84.82 14.79 2.87 3.84 
Modoc 21 24.59 23.16 14.34 39.16 24.82 7.52 -­‐8.50 -­‐8.94 
Mono 12 53.07 59.83 26.37 65.17 38.80 13.90 0.31 6.57 
Monterey 180 63.94 67.98 13.96 93.21 79.26 14.63 4.65 6.77 
Napa 160 62.11 63.74 29.77 83.76 53.99 9.62 5.34 6.89 
Nevada 74 48.80 47.14 29.75 74.98 45.23 11.67 0.51 -­‐0.59 
Orange 1511 56.71 55.59 29.12 90.87 61.75 10.55 7.82 7.27 
Placer 316 42.75 43.16 8.36 78.34 69.98 10.26 -­‐0.54 1.14 
Plumas 29 39.08 38.00 19.94 65.71 45.76 9.53 -­‐5.69 -­‐6.09 
Riverside 756 51.82 50.99 5.30 89.48 84.18 13.33 -­‐0.41 -­‐0.41 
Sacramento 1164 58.16 58.67 20.36 84.14 63.79 12.53 5.56 6.72 
San	  Benito 46 52.70 52.22 17.01 76.66 59.65 13.38 0.18 -­‐2.39 
San	  Bernardino 918 52.94 53.25 3.80 85.73 81.93 14.22 1.56 2.62 
San	  Diego 1808 59.82 60.76 18.12 93.96 75.84 13.50 6.63 7.83 
San	  Francisco 589 85.37 85.25 65.62 97.24 31.62 5.83 13.52 12.86 
San	  Joaquin 433 51.99 53.93 3.01 83.41 80.40 15.62 -­‐1.39 -­‐1.00 
San	  Luis	  Obispo 152 53.54 52.00 15.02 79.85 64.82 12.49 -­‐0.12 -­‐0.12 
San	  Mateo 424 73.27 73.65 25.45 88.33 62.89 6.78 10.55 10.71 
Santa	  Barbara 230 62.87 65.51 12.27 91.96 79.70 16.81 6.05 9.09 
Santa	  Clara 972 70.35 70.79 25.08 92.85 67.78 8.18 8.04 8.62 
Santa	  Cruz 200 71.97 71.62 41.80 100.0 58.20 9.46 3.29 3.28 
Shasta 117 31.15 31.04 12.22 48.50 36.28 7.57 -­‐9.88 -­‐9.89 
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Sierra 19 37.53 36.84 24.52 65.10 40.58 9.45 -­‐4.70 -­‐6.77 
Siskiyou 58 37.51 36.72 17.21 62.20 44.98 11.77 -­‐6.15 -­‐7.46 
Solano 198 55.84 57.08 16.23 94.28 78.06 14.56 0.64 0.95 
Sonoma 352 63.83 64.75 28.40 89.22 60.82 9.87 2.76 4.21 
Stanislaus 204 48.90 50.20 19.78 76.13 56.35 12.57 1.13 1.79 
Sutter 51 37.81 39.69 14.39 57.22 42.83 10.93 -­‐3.67 -­‐0.96 
Tehama 46 30.37 29.24 9.19 47.15 37.96 8.21 -­‐8.43 -­‐9.76 
Trinity 24 36.31 37.67 14.70 51.03 36.34 9.25 -­‐9.24 -­‐8.64 
Tulare 198 40.56 40.14 0.63 77.93 77.30 15.74 -­‐2.01 -­‐1.98 
Tuolumne 73 36.72 37.55 16.51 53.21 36.70 8.11 -­‐8.77 -­‐7.46 
Ventura 511 58.78 57.46 11.47 88.22 76.75 11.35 4.70 4.70 
Yolo 121 61.38 60.61 24.77 90.13 65.36 16.58 5.69 5.66 
Yuba 45 38.23 41.69 15.61 57.27 41.66 10.26 -­‐7.87 -­‐4.81 
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